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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In his paper “An Argument-Operational-Conjectural Approach in Criminal Trials,” 
Professor Novani argues that a judge or jury in criminal trial deliberations must avoid 
blindly relying on scientific evidence or expert testimony alone without critical reflection 
on that evidence, that is, reasonable doubt. Reaching a decision beyond reasonable doubt 
involves putting questions to expert witnesses and cross-examining them. Further, all 
terms used in the expert testimony should be clearly defined thus resulting in a 
“translation” of the testimony into something more understandable, followed by a second 
critical examination of the translated testimony. Only after a process of deliberation as 
outlined above has been conducted should a verdict be passed by judge or jury. While I 
am in agreement with Professor Novani that criminal trial deliberations should involve 
critical examination of the evidence rather than being blindly led by it, I am not so sure 
about some of the examples he uses to illustrate this point. 
 
2. UNDERESTIMATING THE IMPORTANCE OF PROBABILITY IN LEGAL 
REASONING 
 
In one example from Professor Novanis’ paper, the prosecutor argues—based on expert 
testimony—that there is a DNA match found at the crime scene where the chances of a 
match are 10 out of 10,000,000. From this, the prosecutor infers that the probability of the 
defendant’s being innocent given a match are 10 out of 10,000,000. Professor Novani 
then argues that what the prosecutor overlooks is that given the match, the probability of 
innocence is really 9 out 10 (or the probability of guilt is only 1 out of 10). The idea here 
is that before critical reflection on the evidence, it would appear that the chances of 
innocence are miniscule—10 out of 10,000,000—whereas after reflection on the data, the 
chance of innocence is actually 9 out of 10.  
  The problem with the way this example is presented is that the probability of the 
defendant’s DNA matching the DNA found at the crime scene—10 out of 10,000,000—is 
ignored or discounted. However, it needs to be factored in to calculate the probability that 
the defendant is innocent. The event the judge or jury needs to consider is actually a 
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complex conjunctive event, viz., the defendant’s DNA matching and the defendant’s not 
having committed the crime. To calculate the probability of this conjunctive event using 
classical probability theory, we would need to use the multiplication rule. 
 
 P(DNA match) = 1 X 10-6 
 P(not committing the crime/DNA match) = 9 X 10-1 
P(DNA match and not committing the crime) = P(DNA match) X P[not 
committing the crime/DNA match] = (1 X 10-6) X (9 X 10-1) = 9 X 10-7 or 
0.0000009 
 
Thus, the probability of the defendant’s DNA matching and not having committed the 
crime is .0000009, and so the probability of innocence is 0.0000009 and not 0.9. 
Assuming the expert testimony regarding the DNA match is reliable, then the probability 
of the defendant’s being innocent is only 0.0000009. In the absence of any other suspects 
or reasons to doubt the testimony of the expert witness, there is good reason to suspect 
guilt in such a case.  
 With this said, I will grant that Professor Novani makes an important point. The 
judge or jury must critically evaluate the evidence before making an inference resulting in 
a conviction. For example, was there tampering of the evidence, was there contamination 
of the DNA, and so forth. Also, is the laboratory that carried out the testing reliable, and 
does it have a good track record?  Another important concern is whether other companies 
performed the tests and had similar results. These are legitimate questions that ought to 
be considered before a decision to convict is made. Nonetheless, the odds of a DNA 
match but not committing the crime—0.0000009—gives pause for concern. 
In the same vein, recall the O.J. Simpson murder case in the United States. Using 
DNA matching, it was found that blood discovered at the murder scene matched O.J.’s 
blood. Experts testified that the odds of Simpson’s blood matching the blood at the 
murder scene were 1 in 170,000,000. [1] In addition, a pair of bloody socks found in 
Simpson’s bedroom had blood that according to DNA testing matched the blood of 
Nicole Simpsons. The probability of a match without it being Nicole Simpson’s blood 
was estimated to be 1 in 9.7 billion. [1] Now, consider the probability of the complex 
conjunctive event A, Simpsons’ blood matching the blood at the murder scene without 
his having been there and B, Nicole Simpson’s blood matching the blood on O.J.’s sock 
without it being her blood. Ignoring conditional probabilities for the moment, the 
probability of this conjunctive event is as follows: 
 
P(A and B) = P(A) X P(B) = (1.7 X 10-8) X (9.7 X 10-9) = 1.65 X 10-18 
 
That is, the probability of this conjunctive event is 0.00000000000000000165. Once 
again, this probability should give pause for concern. To be fair, there was evidence in 
the Simpson case of evidence tampering and there was some question as to whether or 
not the DNA had been contaminated. However, were these reservations sufficient to 
justify reasonable doubt?  This is a matter to be resolved by legal experts. The probability 
of finding Simpson at a golf course after his acquittal was quite high, no doubt. 
 Finally, the case of Sally Clark was cited by Professor Novani as another example 
involving flawed legal reasoning. As Novani notes, Sally Clark was accused of killing her 
 2 
COMMENTARY ON SERGIO NOVANI 
 3 
first child at 11 weeks and then of conceiving another child and killing that child at 8 
weeks. It was found that the odds of both children having died from SIDS was 1 out of 
73,000,000, i.e., 7.3 X 10-7. On the basis of this probability, the prosecution argued for 
conviction. Novani’s criticism of the prosecution’s reasoning is that this probability was 
not compared with the probability of a mother killing a child, conceiving another one, 
and then killing it. That is, a proper context or background was needed to evaluate the 
significance of the probability of two children dying from SIDS in the same family.  
 While I am sympathetic to Novani’s reservations, surely the probability of 
someone serially killing two of their children is quite low. If the probability of someone 
doing this is higher than the probability of two children dying of SIDS in the same family 
then it would be more likely that Clark killed her children than that they both died from 
SIDS. So such a strategy could well backfire on the defense. Granted, if the probability of 
two children in the same family dying of SIDS is roughly the same as the probability of a 
parent killing them both, then giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt, more 
evidence would need to be presented—such as a history of violence or mental 
instability—to reach a conviction. If the probability of two children in the same family 
dying of SIDS is more likely than a parent killing them both, then once again, more 
evidence would need to be presented for a conviction.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
My overall point is that Professor Novani is perhaps underestimating the power of 
statistical evidence and probability in criminal trials. If your DNA is found at a crime 
scene and the odds of that happening are 10 out of 10,000,000 then the prosecution has a 
strong case pending contrary evidence. 
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